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Approach 
The validity period of contracts regulating production of public transport in 
Scandinavia varies greatly, from one-year agreements to ten years plus options. 
For contracts of a certain duration there will – in most cases, at one time or 
another – occur a need to deviate from the original agreed-upon production 
contract. Many circumstances may cause a need for change in a contract to occur, 
for example budget changes, changes in political priorities or demographical 
issues causing traffic streams to change more or less permanently.  
The key question in this paper is as follows: 
How is the need for change in a signed contract for production of public transport 
services handled, in contracts entered into as a result of competitive tenders? 
Further;  
1. What are the most common guidelines for contract amendments in public 
transport production? 
2. What is common practice when a need for a contract amendment rises? 
3. What are the usual results of negotiations concerning contract amendments 
in public transport?  
In order to answer these questions, we have examined competitive tendering 
contracts and the handling of contract amendments in 8 Scandinavian cases.  
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Introduction 
A brief introduction to Norway 
Norway has a population of approximately 4.5 million inhabitants. The country 
consists of 19 counties, most of them including large sparsely populated areas and 
some small towns. There are a few major cities: Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim are 
the largest. Public transport in Norway reflects the demographical structure of the 
country. Public transport in the countryside differs greatly from urban public 
transport. The largest segment of the public transport market is operated by local 
bus, coach, train, ferries and high speed passenger boats. In Oslo there is also an 
underground system and a separate tram system. 
 
Competitive tendering of bus services in Norway 
The provision of the Norwegian public transport has changed the last fifteen 
years. Competition in the market has increased as competitive tendering has been 
introduced. Subsidies declined by 42 % from 1986 to 1999 (Fearnley and 
Carlquist 2001). Changes in the Transport Act, which allowed for competitive 
tendering of public transport operations were approved by the Government in 
1991 and gradually set in force from April 1994. In April 2002 full scale 
competitive tendering was allowed in Norwegian public transport operations. 
Most counties have introduced tendering to some extent, but only two so far 
(Vestfold and Akershus1 counties) in full scale involving all public transport 
operations by bus. A projection of tendering in the bus market in Norway shows 
that 28 % of the public transport marked will be subject to competitive tendering 
in 2005, and the number will increase in the years to come (Bekken 2004). About 
half of all Norwegian counties have experiences with competitive tendering of bus 
operations. Compared to Sweden and Denmark, Norway was late introducing 
competitive tendering, and has not yet caught up with the neighbouring countries 
in the extent of competition in public transport.  
It is the county councils who purchase public transport in Norway. 
 
Methodology 
The contracts that are studied here are gathered from the counties of Oppland, 
Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold and Rogaland in Norway, Västernorrland and Halland in 
Sweden, and Copenhagen in Denmark. The contracts have been made available to 
us by the county councils, except from the Vestfold contracts, where we were not 
allowed access to the actual document but were told what was in it.  
The conclusions are partly based on readings of the contents of the formal 
contracts, and partly on interviews with representatives of the authorities. It is 
important to emphasise that we have not interviewed representatives of the bus 
operators in these counties, so the counties counterparts have not been heard. This 
might have given us a potentially skewed picture of how the contracts function, 
but informal talks with operators conducted posterior to the data collection among 
authorities confirm our conclusions.   
                                                 
1 The SL (Greater Oslo) area. 
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We have examined eight cases only. These cases were chosen because they had 
their origin in competitive tenders, but also because we believe they give a 
representative picture of this kind of contract and the practice of them in 
Scandinavia. However, the low number of cases makes it difficult to generalize 
our conclusions further than to the contracts we have actually studied.  
This paper has its origin in research commissioned by the Norwegian branch of 
multinational bus operating company Connex.   
 
Cases 
We will now give a description of contracts and contractual practice in each of the 
eight cases. We will focus on how issues of dynamic adaptation are handled 
through economic incentives, contractual clauses on negotiations and informal 
conduct.  
 
Oslo 
The better part of bus operations in Oslo have at one time or another been 
tendered since public transport tendering was allowed by law in 1994. In 2006-
2007 all bus operations in the capital will be tendered. AS Oslo Sporveier, a 
public limited co., handles all public purchases of bus operations. The company 
does not have any in-house transport operations, but the community of Oslo owns 
the subway operator, tram operator and the largest bus operator in town, all public 
limited cos. Subway and tram operations have so far not been tendered. 
The contracts in Oslo are gross cost contracts, and contain opportunities for 
bonuses as well as sanctions. However, the levels of incentives are relatively low 
seen as part of the total contract sum.  
The Oslo contract does contain a clause saying that there might be a need for 
adjustments in the contract, and levels of financial compensations for such 
changes are stated. A 1 % change in production is allowed without economical 
compensation for the operator. The authorities are granted the formal right to 
initiate changes. 
In practice, the parties in the Oslo contract do negotiate, even if the contract does 
not state any formal rights for the operator to re-negotiate if the authorities request 
that the production volumes will change. Changes are usually compensated 
financially, but the level of compensation varies according to reason. 
 
Akershus 
A large part of bus operations in Akershus county in the south-east of Norway are 
tendered. Akershus is a densely populated area, with a great deal of commuting 
towards Oslo. AS Stor-Oslo Lokaltrafikk (Greater Oslo Local Transport Plc) 
handles most public purchases and tenders of bus operations in the area 
surrounding Oslo.  
The Akershus contracts are gross cost contracts, containing sanctions but no 
possible bonuses for the operators. The levels of incentives are relatively low. The 
contracts do allow for changes in the agreed upon production, and there are levels 
of financial compensation in the contracts.  
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There is a 3 % change in production allowed without economical compensation 
for the operator. The contract grants the authorities the formal right to initiate 
changes in production. When the volumes of production are increased above the 3 
% level the operator is granted an economic compensation per cost/km according 
to predefined thresholds. In practise, the compensation is handled pretty much 
according to the contracts, but authorities allow leeway in informal negotiations. 
Formally, the operator does not have any rights to re-negotiations of contracts if 
the production volume changes, but in practice there are negotiations and informal 
talks anyway.  
 
Vestfold 
Vestfold county is found to the south-west of Oslo. The county is densely 
populated along the coastline, and there is a great deal of commuting towards the 
greater Oslo area. In Vestfold the plc Vestfold Kollektivtrafikk (Vestfold Public 
Transport) handles all tenders of bus operations. All bus operations in Vestfold 
are tendered.  
The Vestfold contracts are gross cost contracts, containing no bonuses and 
relatively low levels of sanctions. The contract is considered confidential by the 
Vestfold plc, but management have described the contract contents relatively 
detailed. There is a 1 % change in production allowed without financial 
compensation for the operator, and the formal right to initiate change lies with the 
authorities. In practice, the financial compensation for changes of production 
varies. There are no strict rules for such compensation, but operators are usually 
compensated for extra position driving or cost/km. The operators do not have a 
formal right to re-negotiate if production volumes change, but in practice 
negotiations are common and successful.  
 
Oppland 
Oppland county is situated to the north-east of Oslo, where Lillehammer hosts the 
county administrative headquarters. The county administration handles all bus 
operation tenders, and Oppland was the first county in Norway to tender bus 
operations in 1994. Since then, Oppland county has carried out a number of 
tenders. In the winter of 2004-2005, Oppland county council stopped plans for a 
new tender in one of the counties small sized towns. As a consequence of this, the 
contracts for bus operations will in this political period be negotiated rather than 
tendered.   
However, our basis for choosing Oppland as one of the case counties are the 
contracts entered into as result of previous tenders.  
The Oppland contract is a gross cost contract, containing passenger related 
incentives and low levels of sanctions. The contract does allow for changes in 
production, and there are defined levels for financial compensation for such 
changes. A 2 % change in production is allowed without financial compensation 
for the operator. Authorities are granted the formal right to initiate change. 
Increasing volumes are compensated financially by 90 % of the cost/kilometres 
agreed upon for normal production. Formally the operators have no rights to re-
negotiate if the production volumes are changing, but representatives of the 
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authorities have told in interviews that established informal conduct in the county 
is that re-negotiations are carried out on an irregular basis.  
 
Rogaland 
Rogaland county is situated in south-western Norway. The largest city in the 
county is Stavanger, and most of the Atlantic coast in the greater Stavanger area is 
densely populated with a great deal of commuting to and fro the city.  
It is the plc Kolombus that handles all public purchases of public transport in 
Rogaland county. Kolombus was established in 2001, in order to handle purchases 
more professionally than the county considered they could do in-house. Some 
activities, such as permissions, strategic planning and stipulation of fares are 
handled by the county in-house.  
Rogaland county has carried out three rather large tenders for bus operations in 
the Stavanger area. All three were won by Connex, and the contracts following 
the competition have been subject to legal dispute that in the end was settled 
outside of the courts. The settlement granted the operator a substantial 
compensation for (among other things) changes in production volumes. One of the 
operators’ claims was that the contract did not sufficiently define how changes in 
production volumes should be handled.   
The Rogaland contract is a gross cost contract with no bonuses and low levels of 
sanctions. The contract allows for changes in production, and there are defined 
levels of financial compensation for the operator in the contract. Unlike the other 
Norwegian contracts we discuss in this paper, the Rogaland contracts do not allow 
for any un-compensated production changes. The authorities are granted the 
formal right to initiate changes. Increasing volumes are compensated financially 
per cost/kilometre, varying on daily hours. The operator is not granted any formal 
rights to re-negotiate if the production volumes changes, which is one of the 
reasons the contract was considered cloudy judicial waters by Connex’ legal 
advisers.  
 
Västernorrland 
In 1989, the Swedish parliament passed legislation to encourage public-private 
competition (Andersen 1994). Swedish counties tender public transport to a larger 
extent than Norwegian counties do, and since they got a head start, it is 
appropriate to say that Swedish counties have more experience than the 
Norwegians.  
There are 21 Swedish counties (län), and the public purchase of public transport is 
for the most part handled by plcs called Länstrafikbolag (County transport 
companies).  
Västernorrland is in the north-west of Sweden, and the largest city is Sundsvall. 
We have studied the Sundsvall net cost contract2. The contract does open up for 
changes in the contract, and there are levels of financial compensation stated in 
                                                 
2 The data collection for this project was done in august 2004. Management at “Din Tur”, the plc 
in Västernorrland, informed us that new contracts were about to be signed. However, our work 
here is based on the older net cost contracts.  
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the contracts. There are no changes in production allowed without financial 
compensation for the operators. The formal right to initiate changes is granted to 
both operators and authorities. Increasing volumes are compensated financially 
per cost/kilometre (NB: this is a net cost contract!). The operator has a formal 
right to re-negotiate when the production volumes changes, and the financial 
compensation varies according to the result of negotiations.  
 
Halland 
The county of Halland is situated in the south-west of Sweden, along the coast 
south of Gothenburg. The largest town in the county is Halmstad. For the last 
thirty years Halland shows the greatest percentage population growth of all 
Swedish counties. The plc Hallandstrafiken handles all public purchases of public 
transport in Halland.  
The Halland contract is a gross cost contract with a substantial level of patronage 
incentives; 20-25 % of the total sum. The contract does open up for changes in the 
contract period, and there are stated levels for financial compensation for the 
operator should such changes occur. There are no changes in production allowed 
without financial compensation for the operator. The formal right to initiate 
changes are granted both authorities and operator. The financial compensation for 
increasing volumes are given according to thresholds predefined in the contract 
and comes in addition to patronage incentives. The operator is given a formal 
right to re-negotiate if the production volumes change.  
 
Copenhagen 
Copenhagen has approximately 1.1 million inhabitants. Public transport in 
Copenhagen is carried out by bus, train and a metro system. 
 All public purchase of public transport in Copenhagen is carried out by The 
Greater Copenhagen Authority (HUR). HUR is a politically-governed regional 
organisation covering the greater Copenhagen region, and was established in 
2000. The governing HUR Council is made up of regional politicians from the 
five local/regional authority units: the counties of Copenhagen, Frederiksborg and 
Roskilde and the cities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg. 
The Copenhagen contract is a gross cost contract, with some bonuses attached. 
The contract allows for changes in the contract period, and defines levels of 
financial compensation for changes. Changes in production are not allowed 
without financial compensation. Authorities are granted the formal right to initiate 
change. Financial compensation for increasing volumes is granted per 
cost/kilometre and per vehicle. The operator is given a formal right to re-negotiate 
if the production volumes must be changed.  
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Table 1: Contractual contents and informal conduct regarding production changes 
during the contractual period in Scandinavian public transport 
 Oppland Rogaland Akershus Vestfold Oslo Copenhagen Väster-
norrland 
Halland 
Incentives Yes, low 
levels 
Yes, low 
levels 
Yes, low 
levels 
Yes, very 
low levels 
Yes, low 
levels 
No Yes, net-cost 
contract! 
Yes, 20-25% 
Bonuses No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Malus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Does the 
contract open 
up for 
changes? 
Yes Yes Yes Have not 
seen the 
contract 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial 
compensation 
levels stated in 
contract? 
Yes Yes Yes Have not 
seen the 
contract 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Changes in 
production 
allowed without 
financial 
compensation 
2 % No 3 % 1 % 1 % No No No 
Formal right to 
initiate changes  
Authorities Authorities Authorities Authorities Authorities Authorities Both 
authorities 
and operator 
Both 
authorities 
and operator 
Financial 
compensation 
for increasing 
volumes 
90% of 
cost/km 
(average) 
Per cost/km 
varying on 
daily hours 
Per cost/km 
according to 
thresholds 
predefined in 
the contract  
Have not 
seen the 
contract 
Not 
predefined in 
the 
contractual 
clauses 
Per cost/km. 
per vehicle 
Per cost/km 
NB: Net-cost 
contract 
According to 
thresholds 
predefined in 
the contract 
+ patronage 
incentives 
Financial 
compensation 
in practice 
As above - As above, 
but leeway 
allowed in 
informal 
talks/-
negotiations 
Varies. No 
strict rule but 
compensatio
n according 
to position 
driving or 
cost/km  
Varies 
according to 
reason and 
mutual talks 
As above Varies 
according to 
negotiations 
As above 
Has the 
operator any 
formal rights to 
re-negotiate if 
changing 
production 
volumes? 
No, but 
according to 
informal 
conduct 
No (no 
information 
on informal 
conduct) 
No, but 
according to 
informal 
conduct 
No, but 
according to 
informal 
conduct  
No, but 
according to 
informal 
conduct  
Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
A comparison of Scandinavian practice 
In the following we will sum up the findings from the eight cases, taking a further 
look at how the potential need for change is handled, comparing current practice 
among the Scandinavian countries. 
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How is the need for change handled? 
The Norwegian contracts state little or nothing about how the need for change 
should be handled. All contracts open up for changes in the contract period, but 
none of the Norwegian contracts grant the operators a formal right to initiate 
change. We see this in relation to the fact that they are all gross cost contracts. 
However, it varies to what extent the financial compensation for increasing 
volumes are defined in the contract. None of the contracts give the operator any 
formal rights to re-negotiate the financial compensation when the production 
volumes change.  
The Danish and the Swedish contracts are more elaborate when it comes to how 
the need for change will be handled: They all give both operators and authorities a 
right to initiate change, allow no increase in production without compensation, 
and grant the operator a formal right to re-negotiate when production volumes 
change.  
Having analyzed the different contracts, we interviewed representatives of 
authorities in each of the cases3. The main findings on this issue were that with 
contracts ranging from two to ten years, a need for changes in production rise on a 
regular basis in all cases:  Needs for change are rather common, and are handled 
by operators and authorities all the time. This can be said for all the cases, 
independently of nationality. In addition, the longer the duration of the contracts, 
the lesser the predictability of future production will be. Thus, the need for 
procedural clauses on how to handle changes increases with the length of the 
contracts.  
A need for contractual amendments may raise the level of conflict. However, we 
found this not to be true in the cases we examined. Authorities report a very low 
level of conflict with the operators, and the conflicts registered are small and 
easily solved. We know of only one contractual dispute in recent years that lead to 
lawsuit in Norway - the Rogaland contract. 
 
A running dialogue on production issues 
Authorities and operators in the Norwegian cases have a running dialogue on 
production issues. When the need for change in agreed-upon production rises, it 
seldom comes as a total surprise for either of the parties. As pointed out above, 
the need to adjust production is common, and so is the ability among authorities 
of handling this issue towards operators.  
There is a close and regular contact between representatives of the authorities and 
operators, where the people involved discuss production related issues such as 
network, timetables, patronage and fare structure. This regular dialogue does, over 
time, build personal relationships and trust between representatives of either 
organisation. Establishing trust between the parties is a requirement for this 
practice to work. We find evidence of this in our interview material.  
 
                                                 
3 Except for Vestfold county, where we were not allowed to read the contract, but instead went 
directly for interviews. 
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The Norwegian Way: Informal talks and negotiations  
The empirical analysis of contracts and practises indicate that how the Norwegian 
contracts are handled in real life is more important than how they are drawn up. 
This is the case in Norway, as opposed to the more formalised practice in 
Denmark and Sweden.  
When we compare Scandinavian contracts, the most immediate difference 
between them is that the Norwegian contracts are less extensive than the Swedish 
and Danish ones. The authorities demand and define less in terms of at least two 
things: Mutual cooperation and establishment of arenas for such cooperation and 
development, and what are the authorities’ responsibilities in the partnership. This 
is to a higher degree defined in the Swedish and Danish contracts. 
The Swedish and Danish contracts are more extensive on a number of other 
subjects as well. Technical standards and work force qualifications are two 
variables where the specifications are numerous and detailed at another level than 
in the Norwegian contracts. The advantage of a highly detailed contract is that 
both parties have a formal framework for the cooperation, where there is little 
doubt as to what is demanded of either operators or authorities. The disadvantage 
is that with highly detailed contracts it may be difficult for the operator to fulfil all 
demands made, and it may be equally difficult for the authorities to control that 
the operator has fulfilled the demands. Another disadvantage is that a highly 
detailed contract gives the operator less room for creativity and room to 
manoeuvre in the market, which may lead to a weaker result. This is especially 
important when the contract in use is a net cost contract where one of the goals is 
to give the operator more freedom to act in the local market.  
When there is a need for changes in contract, authorities usually negotiate. 
Negotiations occur when changes are larger than what is regulated by the contract. 
Representatives of the authorities express their understanding for the operators’ 
focus on expenses under such circumstances. Authorities usually accept and pay a 
partly compensation, e.g. extra mileage. The Norwegian contracts are weak on 
this point, as they poorly regulate cooperation, mutual responsibilities dialogue 
and the explicit responsibilities of the authorities. These elements are primarily 
exercised without guidelines, and exercise is within an intuitive understanding of 
what is considered “fair practice”.  
We draw the conclusion that practice – how Norwegian operators and authorities 
in effect make business – is more important than the literal contract, because the 
detailing level is relatively low when it comes to re-negotiations and handling of 
contractual amendments. 
 
Established tradition: An explanatory factor 
The duration of contracts is important when we explain why practice surrounding 
contractual amendments in Norway differs from the other Scandinavian countries. 
In Norway there is a tradition for long term negotiated contracts, in most cases 
renewed every tenth year. When contractual duration usually is ten years, stability 
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in relations is vital in order for the system to function4. Manpower seems to be 
relatively stable in operating companies as well as authorities’ organisation, and 
the same individuals occupy central positions for a number of years, developing 
personal knowledge and less formalised relations between the contracting parties 
(Longva and Osland 2005). Hence, a tradition of pragmatic renegotiations of 
contracts is developed over time.   
 
Conclusions and questions that arise from Norwegian practice  
Evidence in our material makes us draw the following conclusions:  
1. The Norwegian contracts for purchases of public transport studied shows a 
lower detailing level than the Swedish and Danish counterparts.  
2. This makes the actual practice and development of trust and arenas of 
cooperation between operator and authorities more important than in 
Denmark and Sweden, where the contracts are more developed, detailed 
and leaves less up to the needed establishment of personal relationships 
between employees of both parties. 
3. The Norwegian system is more fragile than the Swedish and Danish 
systems due to the lack of formality: Cooperation between authorities and 
operator is dependent on personal relationships. As long as the informal, 
regular cooperation and dialogue between operator and authority functions 
all is well, but if the informal practice should collapse, Norwegians, in 
some cases, are left with a somewhat skimpy document that might be an 
insufficient basis for formal cooperation. 
 
A changing market: Will contracts need to change as well? 
With the introduction of competitive tendering, the bus market has opened for 
international actors. Previous to tendering this market was exclusively worked by 
smaller, national operators, for the most part locally based. As long as operators 
are based in the same town or county as the authorities, the physical conditions for 
today’s practice is present. The conditions for establishing and nurturing personal 
relationships are present. Incumbents also had the advantage of developing the 
relationship to authorities over a number of years – building trust and good 
contacts take time.  
When and if multinational operators enter the Norwegian bus market, today’s 
practice may be threatened. Will it be possible (or even desirable?) to establish 
tight relationships and regular dialogue with operators? Operators’ headquarters 
may even be located in another country. Close relationships between operators 
and authorities may to a new extent be considered unwholesome and may trigger 
accusations of corruption. 
New actors in the market may lead to new conditions, which in turn may lead to a 
need for more specific contracts. Trust and tight relationships might not be valid 
reassurance for a smooth public transport operation any more. 
                                                 
4 This is even more the case when the contracts formally regulating the relationship between 
operator and authority are underdeveloped. 
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Is Norway lagging behind? 
In some respects we might say that Norwegian authorities are lagging behind the 
Swedish and Danish authorities examined in this project. Competition in public 
transport operations was introduced later in Norway than in the other countries, 
and as a result the local bus market change took place later. The market, as well as 
practice, is gradually changing. With the establishment of new practice, more 
detailed contracts and an increasingly more professionalized authority practice of 
tendering competitions and contract signings, Norwegian authorities will catch up 
with the neighbours. In the meantime, Norwegian authorities have the advantage 
of learning from the neighbouring authorities who have tried and failed before 
them. 
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